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Perhaps there is no subject under the head of per-
sonal property Yhich presents as many difficulties to the
young stufent of law as that of gifts. It seems tiat as far
back as CoFmnentators have made mention of it, varioas opinions
have prevailed as to whether a gift was not properly a con-
tract, anJ to-day ey'n/in many cases it is considered a mooted
question. It is not my punp~ase in treating this subject to
give the opinions of the various writers on gifts, but will bd
content by citing authorities whenever circumstances require
such. It seems that the subject of gifts did not originate
from English customs or laws, but in the days of Roman great-
ness the custom prevailed, and so it is thnat dona or gifts
were creatures of Roman Law as ,iell as that of Common Law.
A gift as defined in Bovier's Law Dictionary consists in a
voluntary transfer of a thing without consideration. It is
not my purpose to discuss at any length the question whether
or not a gift can be properly classed under th-e hedd of con-
tracts. While there are authorities such as Toullier and
Barbeyrac holding that gifts can properly be classed under
certain kinds of contracts, still the doctrine -"as become
quite firmly established among A.erican and English xriters
of law that a g4ft is not properly a contract. It is true,
however, that when a gift has been made perfect, it partakes
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somewhat of the nature of an executed contract. It has, how-
ever, been maintained in every period of English Law that de-
livery was indispensable in making a gift. Hence it is that
the following maxim has been accepted by all: "Donatio per-
ficitur possessione accipientfs
Before attempting to make any division of gifts, it
might be well to state that certain conditions must be ful-
filled before a gift is completed. The party or parties con-
templating making a gift must possess sufficient mental cap-
acity. The rules which would be applicable in making a con-
tract would hold in executing a gift. Perhaps it is safe to
say that greater care should be exercised, since the give or
donor receives no benefit in return, unless with a view of
pleasure. Another important factor which should be considered
is whether the maker exercised absolute free dom in making
the gift. If a gift has been perfected under undue influ-
ence, as, for example, xhere actual fraud or confidential re-
lations exist, . in case of father and son, physician and
patient, and lawyer and client, or the gift has been obtained
by the person standing in such relations, is prima facie void,
and the burden of proof is thrown on the donee to show that
the gift was the unbiassed act of the donor.
Ledell v Starr, 5 C. E. Green (N. J.) 274.
Garvier v Williams, 44 Mo. 465.
Boyd v De La Montaguie, 76 N. Y. 49o.
Lake v Ramsey, 36 Barb. 49.
Forman v Smith, 7 Lans. 443.
Ferguson v Lanery, '4 Ala. 510.
Jennings v Mc Connell, 17 Ili. 14b.
Matter of Will of Smith, 95 N. Y. 516.
Whitehead v Kennedy, 69 N. Y. 462.
Whipple v Barton, 63 N. 1-. 612.
The English law seems to go still farther than our
own, and places persons who hold confidential relations tow-
ards such in a position of not being able to receive benefits
unless it can be shown to the satisfaction of the court that
the donor had competent and independent advice in acting.
Smith v Key, 7 H. of L. Cas. 772.
Gifts are divided into two classes; gifts inter
vivos, and gifts causa mortis. Gifts inter vivos or siniple
gifts are such as one party makes to arther without the ex-
pectation of death as a moving cause. The perawn who makes
such a gift must be competent to contract and the gift must
be perfected. That is, it must go into immediate and absolute
effect. It has, however, been held in some cases that where
a gift is intendeJ in praesenti, and is accompanied with sach
delivery as the nature of the property will admit, t:iat it
operates at once. But it is far better that all transactions
are fully completed, and that nothing essential remains to be
done in order to make certain of its validity. It must be
remembered that ,Yhile the donor receives no consideration,
it happens that gifts as promises are often tried to be enfore-
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ed, as, fcr example, an agreement to give without consideration
or in consideration of love or affection, transfers no litle
to the property and gives no riglit to one for damages. Such
agreements are considered mere naked agreements.
Ca-penter v Dodge, 20 Vt. 55.
Pope v Dobson, ! Ill. 360.
A promissory note intended purely as a gift by the
maker cannot be enforced, nor is an expression of' promise to
make a gift for a specified benevolent object binding, unless
the transfer has been made and the gift completed.
Noble v Smith, 2 Johns. 52.
Fink v Cox, l8 Johns. 145.
This principle should not be confused, however, with
voluntary subscriptions for charitable purposes, for the mutual
promises of the several subscribers are held sufficient con-
sideration to enforce the promise. This appears to be the
settled doctrine, that equity will refuse to interfere in en-
deavoring to perfect an imperfect gift.
Young v Young, 80 N. Y. 422.
It has become firmly established that delivery is
essential to the consu-nmation of a gift, still it need not be
simultaneous with the mords of donation, but may precede or
succeed them. If it precedes no 1ew delivery in necessary;
but if it succeeds, it makes perfect that which before was in-
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choate. And it shouldl be remembered that after the gift has
been made complete by delivery , it is not necessary for the
donee to retain possession of the property. The delivery neud
not be directly to the donee, but may be to a third person
for him. If the delivery to the third person is simply for
the purpose of delivering it to the donee, as agent or mes-
senger of the donor, the gift is not complete until the sub-
ject of the rift actually is delivered to the donee. And
until the gift has been completed by delivery to the donee,
the donor can revoke the agent's authority aria resume possess-
ion of the gift.
Scott v Lauman, 104 Pa. St. 503.
Marston v Marston, 21 N. . 491.
Hill v Stevenson, 63 Me. 364.
People v Johnson, 14 Ill. 342.
Smith v Ferguson, 90 Ind. 229.
Bedell v Earli, 33 N. Y. 561.
Irish v Motting, 47 Barb. 370.
Judge Audson in his opinion in Beaver v Beaver, 117
N. Y., on page 430, said that "a deposit in a savings bank by
one person of his own money to the credit of another is con-
sistent with an intent on the part of the fepositor to give
the money to the other." Perhaps there is no case which throis
more light on the question of delivery to third parties than
that of Beaver v Beaver. The father, John Beaver, had depos-
ited in the Ulster County Savings Bank $1,000.00 to the credit
of his son Aziel. There was no evidence except thnat John
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Beaver said: "I started Aziel in life,--gave him $1,000.00."
On the trial defendants, beinL, his mother and sister, claimed
that John Beaver had retained the pass-book of the bank up
to his death, anJ claimed that no gift had been made. They
acting as administrators demanded the moneys which had been
deposited to the credit of Aziel, as it was supposed. Pay-
ment was refused by the Bank, and a suit was brought which
resulted in the following opinions from the several courts in
,Which it was tried. A judgment was rendered in favor of de-
fendants before Judge Edwards in the Ulster County Circuit,
and afterwards judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff.
53 Hun 258. The Court of Appeals afterwards reversed the
judgment and ordered a new trial. The court said on the trial
that the only evidence relied upon to establish an intent on
the part of the father to make a gift to Aziel, his son, was
the transaction at the Bank on the day of deposit; that there
was no proof of any oral statements that had transpired after-
wards, and fur that reason the court held that in the case
there were two essential elements lacking; viz:, an intent to
give, and a delivery of the subject of the alleged gift.
Judge Edwards in commenting upon the questions as offered by
the Court of Appeals said: "Since there had been proof estab-
lished to show that declarations had been made by the father
at the time of the deposit -which would necessarily lead me to
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think ti.at the money had been deposited as a gift." He held
that the admission of one that he had made a gift to another
established a consummated gift.
In this case it was claimed by tne widow of Beaver
that the fact that the Rank book had not been given over to
Aziel and still 'emained in the possession of the Bank, it
belonged to her, and should go to the a[iministrator of the :le-
ceased. This is a question which is ofttimes the occasion of
many legal controversies. For the question is, Is the money
deposited in trust or inte nded as a gift. I shall deem it
sufficient by giving the rule which seems to govern in such
cases. In questions of parol gifts to children it would seem
it is not necessary that any solemn act of delivery should be
made. The formal ceremonynof delivery is not essential if it
appears that the donor intended an actual gift at the time,
and evidence of such intention by some act wiicn may be fairly
construed as a delivery under such circumstances it is quite
evident that the question of trust could not be considered,
and a gift is properly established. Where a person holds a
bank-book for another for a number of years, it is regarded
that it was kept as trustee.
Willis v Smith, 91 N. Y. 31.
Motie v Bailey, c- N. Y. 234.
Martin v '3 zik, 7F, N~. ' . LA5.
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However, in Hovard v Smythe, 40 Vt. 59', it was hed
that where a depositor took a pass-book and kept it until his
death, after shich it was found among his effects, it belong-
ed to the niece in whose name it was deposited. This doctrine
is also supported in New Hampshire, Maryland, and Connecticut e
It was held in Young v Young, supra, tihat to establish a valid
gift although a delivery of the subject of the gift to the
donee or to some person for him, so as to divest the possess-
ion and title of the donor, be shown, yet it is not always
necessary that manual delivery should be made; intent to trane
fer is sufficient.
Gray v Gray, 55 N. Y. 72.
Ross v Draper, 56 N. H. 404.
Hildebrandt v Brewer, 6 Tex. 45.
We have seen, therefore, that the law requires of
the donee only that he be able to show that the donor has rel-
inquished dIominion over it in his favor. Another kind of de-
livery which I shall briefly consider is constructive delivery.
This is where a gift is perfected by delivery of the means of
obtaining it; viz., a key to a trunk or warehouse. But tiis
must be accompanied by words of gift of the contents of the
receptacle. The transaction must clearly show that the owner
intended to make the gift of the article to which the key or
symbol was the means of access. This appears to be e 4 uitable
and just, as it checks and prevents fraud from being practiced.
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A very good illustration of this is given in the case of Coop-
er v Burr, 45 Parb. 15. A xoman confined to her bed deliver-
ed to the plaintiff, who haJi taken care of her for many years,
the keys of her trunk and bureau accompanied by Lhe words
gift. Held that this was fufficient to constitute a valid
gi ft.
It seems as a rule that property of every kind may
be -the subject of a valid gift, both corporeal and. incorpor-
eal. However, the subject must be certain, and it has been
held in 17 N. J. Eq. 419, that no gift was bizdding unless the
property was in esse at the time of the attempted gift. It
Yould be quite impossible for me to give all the kinds of
property which are subject to gift , so I shall only endea-
vor to point oat a few. Promissory notes, debts, choses in
action, savings bank books, etc., are some of those that are
of most frequent occurrence. The first which I shall consider
is promissory notes, for these especially are often the sub-
ject of much legal discussion. It is quite evident, and I
might say that the donee of such a note cannot enforce its
paymenz either in law or in equity. And it seems fair and
just that such is the case, as the promise to pay money in
the future is without consideration. If such were true it
would leave open a broad avenue for fraud. It can be revoked
at any time, and can only be said to become a gift when mone
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has been paid, or when it is in the hands of a bona fide hol-
der fo. val-e who has no knowled-,e of the wan6 of consider-
a,.ion Lo be lacking in tne noue. A check received as a gift
is incomplete until presenued or recognized by Lne donee,
unless some specified req es,. has been made by the diawer to
the bank. In the forgiveness of a debt, -e general rule
which is io guide us is that a receipt o, written acKnowledge-
men suating that tne donee has been released f.or furtner
obligations, and that the same is intended as a gift, will
forever release the debtor. This does not hold true, however,
in cases in which part payment is made. It oftens happens
tha-L a person pays part of a debt, and is told by his cred.itor
that he need not pay the remeinder. Such an act on the part
of the creditor would in no way bar his right for the balance,
unless his intention of cancelling the debt had been fully
acted upon.
Bishop on Contracts, Sec. 50/
Gray v Barton, 55 i. Y. 68.
Ellsworth vFo~g, 3 Vt. 355.
Draper v Hitt, 43 Vt. 439.
Larkin v Hardenbrook, 90 N. Y. 333.
B,Tt not the )alancing of the book alone, as there
would be no delivery to complete and perfect tne -ift. I
shall not attempt to discuss or even distinguish between the
uses of gifts and trusts, b-tt shall simpl shox That seems to
be the method of ascertaining how a trust is created. Uo
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particular form of words is requisite. The intent is what
the courts seek.
Nisher v Fields, 10 Johns. 496, 505.
Parry on Trusts, Sec. 89.
In reference to savings Pahk books or deposits, it
would be difficult to give any definite rule until the facts
of each case are known. The following references will serve
to give full a~ithority in the matter.
Smith v Bank, 64 N. H. 400.
Davis v Noy, 125 Mass. 590.
M'artin v Funk, 75 N. Y. 137.
Gilman v Mc Ardle, 99 N. Y. 458.
Another essential element in the consideration of
gifts is acceptance. WXhile it is a general rule that in all
contracts acceptance is necessary, it is also true in the case
of gifts. Yet evidence of only a slight acceptance is neces-
sary. But when gifts are entirely beneficial to the donee,
his acceptance is presumed. And the same principle has been
wisely established in the case of infants. For since they are
unable to make a complete contract, it would be difficult to
say that they were capable of receiving gifts unless some pro-
vision had been made. It is held, though, in some cases, that
unless the donee knew of the gift during the life of the donorJ
acceptance will not be presumed.
Clark v Clark, 108 Mass. 522.
Scott v 7erkshire Savings Bank, 140 Mass. 157.
Pope v :urlington Savings Bank, 56 Vt. 2 4.
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It ismy purpose to cite but one of the many cases
in which gifts may be made, and trat is between parent and
child. Where a parent delivers property to a child and allows
him to use it, the presumption is that it was intended as a
gift. This rule is more particularly true if the sift was
made at the time the child marries, but since the father is
looked upon as the head of the family, a gift made before the
parental authority ceases is considered invalid. However, it
may be shown t!,at such gift is valid. Where a father said to
his son that he might havea certain colt if he yould raise it,
and there was no other evidence tending to show that the fath-
er intended the son to have the colt, and there was no evi-
dence of delivery, it was held that the title to the colt
did not pass.
Mdatlock v Powell, 96 N. C. 499.
Put in Fletcher v Fletcher, 55 Vt. 325, it was held
that where a father in the presence of his family presented to
his son a carriage in the carriage-house, it was sufLficient
to vest the title in the son. liumerous examples might be
cited, but the few which I have mentioned will serve to show
quite clearly the general rile that applies betyeen parents
and children.
There is one more important question which can be
properly classed under this head, and that is where property
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has been given to friends or even strangers with an intent to
defraud creditors . It appears to be firmly established that
any gift made under any such circumstances is void. All the
doctrines of the courts of law and equity hold that any gift
which seems to be tainted in any way with fraud is void. In
the old English case of Reade v Livingston, supra, the rule
was laid down that any voluntary transfer of real estate or
chattels with a view to defraud creditors was void. It is
indeed true that such is the universal rule. For it certainly
would be embarassing if not dangerous to the rights of cred-
itors, and would open up an avenue to fraud. This statute
was enacted during the reign of Elizabeth, and has ever since
been the law of this country.
The nature of proof required to establish a gift is
similar to any other question of fact, being a question for
the jury. The mere delivery is not sufficient. The intention
of the parties and their acts are things which must be passed
upon by a jury. Anything which tends to show that the donee
had done acts in favor of the donor, or great affection ex-
isting between them, would have a tendency to sustain a gift.
However, these are only circumstances that may arise. I have
endeavored to point out a few of the rules in cases which
are -to be found under the head of s-ifts inter vivos, and shall
now consider the second class of gifts, causa mortis.
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A gift causa mortis is defined as a -ift made in ap-
prehension of death by delivering or causing to be deliVered
the possession of any personal goods to another. These gifts
,Tere the subject of frequent discussion in tie Enilish courts.
Justinian, apprehensive of fraud in these gifts, required
them to be executed in the presence of five witnesses. A gift
causa mortis differs from a gift inter vivos in tnat it is
revocable by the donor, and the mental capacity must be the
same as in making a will. They ,vere always looked upon with
suspicion, since they did a-ay virtually with certain amount
of property described in the will. The Kift is not complete
until the death of the donor. And it must be made in appre-
hension of death, and delivered. Great strictness and clear
ppoof are therefore required to establish such gifts; and they
can only be upheld when the intention of the donor is clear
and defihite, and such intent is fully carried out by execu-
tion.
Gains v ish, 43 0. St. 462.
Delmotte v Taylor, 1 Redf. 417.
Hatch v Atkinson, 56 Ile. 324.
Marshall v Berry, 13 Allen 43, note.
It would appear by the definition above quoted that
only personal property can be -Jven in this manner. It has
also been held in Vermont and South Carolina that real estate
cannot be incluted in a -ift causa mortis.
.!each v 1Veach, 24 Vt. 591.
Gilmore v Mitesides, Dudley (S. C. ) 13.
In Curtis v Barous, 5, Hun 165, a delivery of a deed
of real estate was sustained as such a gift. The question
whether land wams a proper subject of a gift was not raised.
At the present time all kinds of personal property with few
exceptions may be the subject of a valid gift causa mortis,
whether the property be corporeal or incorporeal. It is not
settled generally in this country whether the delivery of a
certificate of stock, without some assignment of the shares,
is a good gift causa mortis. It is not a valid gift in Eng-
land or New Jersey.
Moore v Moore, L. R. 1 Eq. 474.
Edgerton v Edgerton, 17 N. J. Eq. 419.
In New York it appears that a delivery of a certif-
icate of stock is good as a gift causa mortis without an as-
signment, or even without a complete transfer of legal title.
Walsh v Sexton, 55 Barb. 251.
In this case the donor ',vas the orner of sixty shares
of stock in a corporation, and executed an assignment of twen-
ty shares which he delivered to his wife to be delivered to
the plaintiff. It was held sufficient, and the administrator
was ordered to make legal transfer. Peckham, J., in deliver-
ing the opinion, said: "I concur in the views expressed by
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the courts which have riot sustained such a rift, both in prin-
ciple and in policy. Rut the authorities are the other way.
In my judgment this doctrine is fraught with the greatest
danger. It leads into temptation fror:. .rich ie all pray to
be delivered, and it greatly facilitates fraud. The Nhole
thing is wrong. But it is settled by authority, and we are
not at liberty to reverse it." There is also a diversity of
opinion as to whether or not a person can transfer the whole
of his property as a Jonatio causa mortis. In Vermont it has
been held that the donor may dispose of all his property by
such a gift. In Pennsylvania it has been decided in one case
that the principal part may be given, while in another case
the court said:that all could not be disposed of in such man-
ner, as partaking of a testamentary character, and contrary
to the spirit of the law of wills. In Iarshall v Berry, supra
a Massachusetts case, there is a Jictum agreeing with the Penn.
sylvania view that such a gift can only apply to certain spe-
cific articles, and not to a disposition of t. e donor's es-
tate.
-.each v Idach, 24 Vt. 5 1.
,lichener v Dule, 23 Pa. St. 58.
Headley v Kirby, 16 Pa. St. 326.
As to the donor's promissory note, it cannot be the
subject of a gift causa mortis, the mere promise of the maker
being a nudum pactum; but the note of a third party may be
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given, the law being the same as in gifts inter vivos. ,-onds,
bills, promissory notes, and other evidences of debt, although
payable to order, may be yiven, even if not endorsed. TIhere a
note or bond secured by a rrort,-ahe is -iven, tue rort,a e goes
witjA the note or bond, althou h the mortgage is not mentioned
in the transfer, and is kept in the donor's possession.
Vrigit v Wright, 1 Cowen 598.
2essions v Fosely, 4 Cush. 87.
Druke v Heiken, 61 Cal. 346.
The donor's own check may be given, but until pay-
ment or acceptance by the bank the s ift is incomplete, and
the death of tne donor before the check is paid or acceptance
acts as a revocation of the gift, providing the donee has not
transferred it to a bona fide holder for value without notice
before the death of the donor.
Vatter of Smither, 30 Hun 632.
National Bank v Williams, 13 Mich. 282.
It has also been held in Pennsylvania that a life
insurance policy, payable to the legal representative of the
assured, can be given causa mortis by .-elivery of tie policy
without an agreement. It is requisite to the validity of a
gift causa mortis that it be made in contemplation of death
of the donor. This gift can only be made by a person who
thinks his death near at hand, and ,7ho makes his gift in vieff
of and on account of riis approaching death. In New York it is
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not necessary that the apprehension of death shall come from
illness. The courts hold that it may arise from infirmity or
old age, or from external or anticipated danger. It must be
founded upon more than some indefinite or unsettled apprehen-
sion. The donor must be in a condition to fear approachirg
death from the proximate or impending peril, or from illness
which precedes dissolution. In Tennessee it has been held
that the anticipation of death to a soldier enlisting in the
army was sufficient foundation for a gift; but in Irish v
:utting, supra, a New York case, it has beet- decided to the
contrary. Where a gift is made during the last illness of
the donor and a short time before his death, it is presumed to
be a gift causa mortis and not inter vivos, and revocable by
the recovery of the donor. The burden of proof would be on
the donee to show t.,at it was a -ift inter vivos, and there-
fore absolute and irrevocable.
Emery v Clough, 63 11. H. 553.
Rhodes v Child, 64 Pa. St. 18.
Allen v Polseczky, 31 Me. 338.
Thompson v Thompson, 12 Tex. 327.
The subject of a gift causa mortis must be delivered
or the gift is not complete or valid. The law as to the kind
of delivery required is substantially the same as in gifts
inter vivos. As a rule the best delivery of which the arti-
cle is capable is required. A delivery by symbol ahen the
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thing itself can be reaiily or easily handea over, as by giv-
inr, a key to a box or a jewel case as a symbol, when the re-
ceptacle or its contents might easily have passe, from hand to
hand, is generally held to be insufficient. There must be
something done in order to change the possession from the
donor to the donee. So necessary is delivery to the validity
of a -,ift of this kind, as was stated in Cutting v Gilman, 41
N. H. 147, that even if the property was in the donee's poss-
ession or in the hands of a third party, there would be no
gift for want of needed delivery to complete it. If it is
delivered to the donee and again comes into possession of the
donor, it raises the presumption t' at it is revoked. Schouler
on Personal Property, Sec. 163, says: "The real question is
whether the donor has by such transfer intentionally and prac-
tically parted with his dominion of the property; and we must
view his facts accordingly." It is settled that delivery to
a third person for a donee is as effective delivery as to the
donee, even if the donor dies before the property reaches the
hands of the donee. But delivery to an agent as agent for
the giver to perform the act or make the delivery only after
the death of the donor would amount to nothing. Like other
frifts there mnst be an acceptance to complete the gift. This
acceptance may be by the donee after the death of the donor,
especially -where the delivery is to a third person for the
benefit of the donee.
A pift causa mortis is not valid against the claims
of creditors. The only property which a man can legally dis-
pose of without conside ation is the balance remaining after
paying his debts; that is, a man must be just before he is
generous. If it is needed to pay the debts and taken by the
administrator for that purpose, the surplus if any remaining
vill g;o to the donee in preference to the intestate's estate.
Kiff v Weaver, 94 N. C. 274.
There may be conditions annexed to this kind of a
gift. A very common one is that the donee shall pay the ex-
penses of the funeral.
We have noticed thus far that an ordinary gift or
gifts inter vivos when completed, except where they are pro-
cured by fraud or force, ar- absolute and irrevocable. But it
is not so with a gift causa mortis. They are specially rev-
ocable in three instances; viz: (1) The donor's recovery from
a particular peril; (2) -y the de.rth of the donee before the
donor; (3) By his own act revoking the gift. And in an early
case in New York it has been held that where a local statute
causes tne revocation of one's will by the subsequent birth
of a child, tlie same consequences iould follow a gift causa
mort i s.
The evidence tending to establish such a gift must
21
be clear and convincing. The burden of proof is necessarily
on the donee, as, in the first place, so many opportunities
and such strong temptations present themselves to unscrupulous
persons to pretend death-bed donations, that there is alxrays
danger of having an entirely fabricated case set up; and,
secondly, withoiat any imputation of fraudulent contrivance,
it is so easy to mistake the meaning of a person languishing
in a mortal illness, and by a slight change of words to con-
vert the expressions of intended benefit into an actual sift
of the property; and no case of this description ought to pre-
vail unless it is supported by evidence of the clearest and
most unequivocal character.

